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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Shannon Marie Olvera appeals from the withheld judgment of the district court entered
upon her conditional guilty plea to possession of methamphetamine. On appeal, Olvera argues
the district court erred when it denied her motion to suppress.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
Very early in the morning, while it was still dark out, Officer Shackelford saw a car
driving around a storage facility. (See 10/11/17 Tr., p. 53, L. 25 – p. 55, L. 23; see also Ex. 1 at
0:00 to 2:49 1.) Officer Shackelford thought it was odd, so he pulled in and parked at least two
car lengths behind the car. (10/11/17 Tr., p. 30, L. 20 – p. 31, L. 7; see also Ex. 1 at 0:00 to
2:49.) Officer Shackelford got out of his car and made contact with Olvera, who was sitting in
the car. (See 10/11/17 Tr., p. 53, L. 25 – p. 55, L. 23; see also Ex. 1 at 0:00 to 2:49.)
Officer Shackelford: Hello.
Olvera: Hi.
Officer Shackelford: Hi. Can you put your car in park for me?
Olvera: Um, yeah. I’m waiting for a...
Officer Shackelford: Perfect, thank you. What’re you back here doin’?
(Ex. 1 at 0:33 to 0:47.)
Olvera said she was helping “Christina” put some stuff from storage into her apartment.
(Ex. 1 at 0:45 to 3:20.) Officer Shackelford asked if Olvera had identification and Olvera
produced identification. (Id.) Olvera said she had been back in the storage area for about two
1

The video time stamp references are approximate.
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hours. (Id.) Olvera explained that she could drive into the storage area at any time and she had
called Christina to open the gate, but she had not responded. (Id.)
Officer Shackelford asked if Olvera had been doing any drugs and if he could check to
see if there were drugs in her car. (Id.) Olvera said he could check for drugs in her car. (Id.)
Olvera asked if she could call her friend, and Officer Shackelford said she could in “just a couple
of minutes.” (Id.) Olvera then admitted that she had used methamphetamine a few hours earlier.
(Id.)
After this admission, Officer Shackelford had Olvera step out of the car. (Ex. 1 at 3:20 to
5:10.) Officer Shackelford had Olvera step back to the police car. (Id.) Officer Shackelford
searched Olvera’s car and found a baggie of methamphetamine. (Ex. 1 at 8:07 to 10:08.) Officer
Shackelford placed Olvera under arrest. (Id.)
The state charged Olvera with possession of methamphetamine. (R., pp. 34-35.) Olvera
filed a motion to suppress on the grounds that Officer Shackelford seized her without reasonable
articulable suspicion when he made the initial contact. (R., pp. 47-49.) The state responded and
argued that the initial contact was a consensual encounter. (R., pp. 50-54.) The district court
held a hearing on the motion to suppress. (R., pp. 56-58.)
At the suppression hearing, Olvera first testified that the officer’s car blocked her in;
however, she later testified that she could have backed her car up and turned around. (10/11/17
Tr., p. 15, L. 24 – p. 16, L. 24, p. 28, L. 23 – p. 30, L. 4.) She also admitted that the officer’s car
was parked at least two car lengths behind her car and there was enough distance for her to drive
around his car. (10/11/17 Tr., p. 30, L. 20 – p. 31, L. 7.)
Olvera also testified that she was “pretty sure” the officer’s car had its overhead flashing
lights on, but then after the video was played showing the lights were not on, she admitted there
2

were no overhead lights. (10/11/17 Tr., p. 26, L. 21 – p. 28, L. 22.) Olvera conceded that, other
than wearing his uniform and driving a police car, the officer did not display any show of
authority. (10/11/17 Tr., p. 32, L. 25 – p. 34, L. 2.)
The district court considered all of the circumstances and found that a reasonable person
would have felt free to leave when Officer Shackelford approached and politely asked if Olvera
could put the car in park. (10/11/17 Tr., p. 53, L. 25 – p. 55, L. 23.) As a result, the initial
encounter between Officer Shackelford and Olvera was consensual and Olvera failed in her
burden to show there was a stop that implicated the Fourth Amendment. (Id.) The district court
found that this case was not distinguishable from State v. Randle, 152 Idaho 860, 276 P.3d 732
(Ct. App. 2012), and denied Olvera’s motion to suppress. (Id.)
Olvera entered a Rule 11 conditional guilty plea and reserved the right to appeal the
district court’s denial of her motion to suppress. (R. pp. 68-70.) The district court withheld
judgment and placed Olvera on probation for five years.
appealed. (R., pp. 79-81.)
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(R., pp. 72-76.)

Olvera timely

ISSUE
Olvera states the issue on appeal as:
Did the district court err by concluding Ms. Olvera was not “seized” within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment, and by denying her motion to suppress on that
basis?
(Appellant’s brief, p. 6.)
The state rephrases the issue as:
Has Olvera failed to show the district court erred when it determined, after viewing the
video, that Olvera was not “seized” and denied her motion to suppress?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Did Not Err When It Denied Olvera’s Motion To Suppress
A.

Introduction
Officer Shackelford approached Olvera’s parked car and asked her a few questions. (See

Ex. 1 at 0:45 to 3:20.) Officer Shackelford did not have his overhead lights on, he did not draw
his weapon, and his car was parked at least two car lengths behind Olvera’s car. (See id; see also
10/11/17 Tr., p. 30, L. 20 – p. 31, L. 7.)

After Olvera admitted to recently using

methamphetamine Officer Shackelford detained Olvera while he investigated. (See Ex. 1 at 3:20
to 5:20.) Pursuant to her consent, Officer Shackelford searched her car and found a baggie of
methamphetamine. (Ex. 1 at 8:07 to 10:08.) Officer Shackelford placed Olvera under arrest.
(Id.)
The district court ruled that the initial encounter was consensual and Officer
Shackelford’s polite request that Olvera put her car in park did not change the encounter into a
seizure. (10/11/17 Tr., p. 53, L. 25 – p. 55, L. 22.) On appeal, Olvera has failed to show the
district court erred. The district court applied the correct legal standard and correctly determined
that the initial encounter was consensual.

B.

Standard Of Review
“The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a decision on a

motion to suppress is challenged, the appellate court accepts the trial court’s findings of fact that
are supported by substantial evidence, but freely reviews the application of constitutional
principles to those facts.” State v. Diaz, 144 Idaho 300, 302, 160 P.3d 739, 741 (2007). The
power to assess the credibility of witnesses, resolve factual conflicts, weigh evidence, and draw
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factual inferences is vested in the trial court. State v. Valdez-Molina, 127 Idaho 102, 106, 897
P.2d 993, 997 (1995); State v. Fleenor, 133 Idaho 552, 555, 989 P.2d 784, 787 (Ct. App. 1999).
The appellate court also gives deference to any implicit findings of the trial court supported by
substantial evidence. State v. Brauch, 133 Idaho 215, 218, 984 P.2d 703, 706 (1999).

C.

The District Court Did Not Err When It Denied Olvera’s Motion To Suppress Because
Olvera Failed To Show She Was “Seized” When Officer Shackelford Made Contact With
Her
The district court ruled that Olvera failed to meet her burden to show she was seized

when Officer Shackelford initially approached and spoke with her. (See 10/11/17 Tr., p. 53, L.
25 – p. 55, L. 23.) On appeal, Olvera argues the district court erred when it determined that
under the totality of the circumstances, Olvera was not initially seized. (See Appellant’s brief,
pp. 9-11.) She argues that Officer Shackelford’s actions of asking her to put the car in park,
asking her to keep her hands in front of her, and telling her that she could phone a friend in a
couple of minutes, constituted a show of authority and that she was not free to leave. (See id.)
Contrary to Olvera’s argument on appeal, the district court correctly applied the law to the facts
and held that, under a totality of the circumstances, Olvera was not seized when Officer
Shackelford initially made contact with her.
“An encounter between a law enforcement officer and a citizen does not trigger Fourth
Amendment scrutiny unless it is nonconsensual.” State v. Willoughby, 147 Idaho 482, 486, 211
P.3d 91, 95 (2009) (citations omitted). To constitute a seizure, the officer must, “by means of
physical force or show of authority,” in some way restrain an individual’s liberty. Id. This
“requires words or actions, or both, by a law enforcement officer that would convey to a
reasonable person that the officer was ordering him or her to restrict his or her movement.” Id.
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(citations omitted). “[A] request for identification or mere questioning is not enough, by itself[,]
to constitute a seizure.” State v. Landreth, 139 Idaho 986, 990, 88 P.3d 1226, 1230 (2004)
(citations omitted). “This is so because the person approached need not answer any question put
to him and may decline to listen to the questions at all and go about his business.” State v.
Osborne, 121 Idaho 520, 523-524, 826 P.2d 481, 484-485 (Ct. App. 1991) (citing Florida v.
Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497-498 (1983)). “Thus, where an officer merely approaches a person who
is standing on the street, or seated in a non-moving vehicle located in a public place, and poses a
few questions, no seizure has occurred.” Id. (citation omitted). The relevant inquiry is whether,
under the totality of the circumstances, “a reasonable person would feel free to disregard the law
enforcement officer”; if so, “then the encounter is consensual.” Willoughby, 147 Idaho at 486,
211 P.3d at 95. The burden of proving that a seizure occurred is on the defendant seeking to
suppress evidence. State v. Cardenas, 143 Idaho 903, 907, 155 P.3d 704, 708 (Ct. App. 2006)
(citations omitted).
Here, the district court correctly found that Olvera failed to meet her burden to show that
she was seized when Officer Shackelford initially made contact with her.
THE COURT: I am just talking about what the circumstances are because those
are the circumstances that I take into account, what would a reasonable person
perceive being in that place. They are somewhere where it is very early in the
morning. You can call it early in the morning or way late into the night, however
you perceive it. It’s 5 o’clock, the sun is not shining. We are in -- is this
September? I forget the date.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: April, Your Honor.
THE COURT: April. So we are not at a time when everybody is out and about.
And I’m at a storage facility, a police officer pulls up, parks behind me. He
doesn’t light me up. I’m not being -- I am not being subject to a traffic stop.
Subjectively, if it were me -- but it’s not me; it’s the reasonable person -I’d probably, at that point, turn around and drive away if I had a place to drive.
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Once the officer approaches, the -- he does phrase it in the interrogatory.
And I guess what I would say is that I find that the officer put -- phrased his
approach as an interrogatory. But the phrasing of it is, “Could you put your car in
park, please,” which is a polite way of saying, “Put your car in park.” In other
words, I don’t think a reasonable person sitting behind the wheel of a car at that
time and place would feel that they were free to not put it in park, notwithstanding
the lack of a siren, notwithstanding the lack of a show of force.
I am going to -- I’m going to change that. I think a reasonable person, at
that point, could have asked or said to the officer -- may well have said to the
officer, “I want to leave,” and then, at that point, put the officer to either stop him
or not. I think at that point it’s still a volitional stop. And I am -- frankly, don’t
believe that this is distinguishable from Randle. I think it’s -And so I will find that the defendant -- that the officer’s questioning of the
defendant in this case was not an arrest for the purposes of the Fourth
Amendment, that the defendant has not met her burden to show that there was a -at this point, a stop that would invoke the Fourth Amendment. I would not
challenge the search past that.
(10/11/17 Tr., p. 53, L. 25 – p. 55, L. 22.)
The district court was correct that this case is not distinguishable from Randle. In
Randle, at 11:30 p.m., an officer noticed Randle’s vehicle alone in a parking lot with its front-end
abutting a grassy knoll. Randle, 152 Idaho at 861, 276 P.3d at 733. The officer parked about two
car lengths behind Randle’s vehicle. Id. Randle’s vehicle was running. Id. The officer knocked
on Randle’s window and Randle opened his door. Id. When Randle opened his door, the officer
noticed open beer cans between the driver and passenger seats. Id. at 862, 276 P.3d at 734. The
officer asked about the beer cans and the passenger claimed both beers were hers. Id. The
officer noticed indicia of alcohol use, and eventually conducted field sobriety tests on Randle.
Id. Randle failed the field sobriety tests and he was charged with felony DUI. Id. Randle moved
to suppress, arguing that the officer did not have reasonable suspicion to stop him. Id. The
district court denied the motion and held that the officer approaching the running car and tapping
on the window was not a seizure and the initial encounter was consensual. Id. On appeal, the
Court of Appeals held there was nothing that prevented Randle from leaving the parking lot. Id.
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at 863-864, 276 P.3d at 735-736. Since the officer’s car was parked two car lengths behind
Randle’s car, Randle could have backed up and driven away. Id. The Court of Appeals cited to
well-established Idaho law that police can approach a parked vehicle and ask the occupants
questions, even if no obvious criminal activity is afoot. Id. at 865-866, 276 P.3d at 737-738
(citing State v. Zubizareta, 122 Idaho 823, 827, 839 P.2d 1237, 1241 (Ct. App. 1992); State v.
McAfee, 116 Idaho 1007, 1010, 783 P.2d 874, 877 (Ct. App. 1989)). That is what happened
here; Officer Shackelford approached Olvera’s parked car and asked her questions.
Olvera argues that the district court’s reliance on Randle was “misplaced” because the
district court in Randle made an express finding that the defendant’s car was not blocked and
“[n]othing in Randle suggests the officer gave the defendant specific instructions that would have
restricted his movements in any way.” (Appellant’s brief, pp. 10-11.) Olvera’s attempt to
distinguish Randle fails. While there is no indication in Randle that the officer asked Randle to
put his car in park, the officer in Randle actually knocked on Randle’s window. See Randle, 152
Idaho at 861, 276 P.3d at 733. Here Officer Shackelford did not knock on Olvera’s window.
(See Ex. 1 at 0:00 to 0:45.) Officer Shackelford stayed several feet away and politely asked
Olvera if she could put her car in park. (See id.) A polite request to put the car in park is no
more intrusive than physically knocking on the window of a running car, as the officer did in
Randle, and therefore not a seizure.
Olvera also argues that Randle is distinguishable because, she claims, the district court
did not make express findings that her car was not blocked. (See Appellant’s brief, pp. 10-11.)
While the district court did not make express findings, the district court appeared to agree that
Officer Shackelford’s car was two car lengths behind Olvera’s car. Olvera testified that Officer
Shackelford’s car was parked at least two car lengths behind her car and there was enough
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distance for her to drive around his car. (10/11/17 Tr., p. 30, L. 20 – p. 31, L. 7.) During a
discussion with the prosecutor, the district court stated that, while he could not tell exactly how
much room there was, he agreed that Olvera testified there was sufficient room to turn around:
THE COURT: I’ve got to tell you, I can’t see that from the video. I just can’t tell.
And it’s because of the video, the perspective for me, I cannot, from my own view
of it, determine how much space there is because of the angle. And it’s two
dimensional instead of three. And it’s dark, the edges. And I don’t have a
reference. But the perspective is a storage.
[PROSECUTOR]: Okay.
THE COURT: And so I have difficulty making a determination one way or
another whether there’s room to drive past there. There may well be. I can’t see
how big the car the defendant is driving either. But I will just tell you that,
[prosecutor], because, when I am looking at that video, I am looking at the car
parked there. I don’t have a sense of how wide that driveway is other than there is
clearly room beside the police officer, and he’s clearly parked as close to the curb
on the -- from his perspective, on the right side, as he can get.
[PROSECUTOR]: Right. Well -THE COURT: But that’s -- I am just letting you know that. It’s an issue.
[PROSECUTOR]: Well, I mean, I guess there is not much -THE COURT: No.
[PROSECUTOR]: -- there is not much I can say to that. From the State’s
perspective, the video is quite clear. When you look at the width of the police
vehicle and the remaining width of the road, it’s clearly further than what police
believe the vehicle is.
Be that as it may -THE COURT: Regardless.
[PROSECUTOR]: -- I will say that the defendant, on cross examination, herself,
admitted that there was room for her to back up and turn around and leave. And so
she said that on cross examination.
THE COURT: Right.
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(10/11/17 Tr., p. 42, L. 4 – p. 43, L. 19.) Olvera’s testimony that there were two car lengths
between her car and the officer’s car mirrors the evidence in Randle, where there were also two
car lengths between Randle’s car and the officer’s car. See Randle, 152 Idaho at 861, 276 P.3d at
733. The district court properly found that Randle controlled.
The holding in Randle and the district court’s conclusion in this case are both consistent
with the standards set forth in case law.
Examples of circumstances that might indicate a seizure, even where the person
did not attempt to leave, would be the threatening presence of several officers, the
display of a weapon by an officer, some physical touching of the person of the
citizen, or the use of language or tone of voice indicating that compliance with the
officer’s request might be compelled.
State v. Pieper, 163 Idaho 732, 418 P.3d 1241, 1243 (Ct. App. 2018), review denied June 7, 2018
(citing United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980)). “Other circumstances that may
indicate a seizure include whether an officer used overhead emergency lights or took action to
block a vehicle’s exit route.” Id. (citing Willoughby, 147 Idaho at 487-88, 211 P.3d at 96-97;
State v. Schmidt, 137 Idaho 301, 302-03, 47 P.3d 1271, 1272-73 (Ct. App. 2002); State v. Fry,
122 Idaho 100, 103, 831 P.2d 942, 945 (Ct. App. 1991)). The Court of Appeals in State v.
Liechty explained that “no seizure occurred when the officer approached Liechty’s parked
vehicle and tapped on his window.” 152 Idaho 163, 168, 267 P.3d 1278, 1283 (Ct. App. 2011).
“Further, the officer, without activating his overhead lights, approached Liechty’s vehicle alone,
without a weapon drawn, and did not physically touch Liechty or use threatening language upon
opening the passenger door.” Id. The seizure in Liechty only occurred because the officer
opened the passenger door without Liechty’s consent, stood in the open passenger doorway,
blocked Liechty’s exit, and questioned him. Id. at 169, 267 P.3d at 1284; compare Osborne, 121
Idaho at 523, 826 P.2d at 484 (no seizure initially occurred when the police first approached
11

Osborne’s vehicle, which was parked on a public street). Here, Olvera conceded that, other than
wearing his uniform and driving a police car, Officer Shackelford did not display any show of
authority. (10/11/17 Tr., p. 32, L. 25 – p. 34, L. 2.) Officer Shackelford did not have his
overhead lights on, he did not physically touch Olvera or Olvera’s car, his tone of voice was
pleasant and non-threatening, and he did not display a weapon. During the initial encounter, a
reasonable person would have felt free to leave.
It was only after Olvera admitted to recent methamphetamine use that the encounter
changed from a consensual encounter into a detention. However, at that point, due to Olvera’s
admissions, Officer Shackelford had reasonable suspicion to detain Olvera. An officer may seize
an individual if the officer has reasonable, articulable suspicion that the individual has committed
or is about to commit a crime. See Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 498 (1983); Terry v. Ohio,
392 U.S. 1, 22 (1968); Fry, 122 Idaho at 103, 831 P.2d at 945. Olvera does not argue that her
admissions did not give rise to reasonable articulable suspicion. (See R., pp. 48-49; 10/11/17 Tr.,
p. 39, L. 18 – p. 40, L. 18, p. 48, L. 22 – p. 52, L. 13; see also Appellant’s brief, pp. 9-11.) Thus,
since the initial encounter was consensual and Olvera was not seized until Officer Shackelford
had developed reasonable articulable suspicion of a crime, the district court did not err when it
denied Olvera’s motion to suppress.
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CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court affirm the order of the district court.
DATED this 18th day of September, 2018.

/s/ Ted S. Tollefson
TED S. TOLLEFSON
Deputy Attorney General
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